2010 TPA Conference

Tennessee Philosophical Association
42nd Annual Meeting: Nov. 12-13, 2010
Vanderbilt University

Keynote Speaker: Owen Flanagan Jr., Duke University

"What Kind of Identity is Narrative Identity"

    Abstract: I explore the thesis that personal identity has some sort of close, possibly necessary connection to knowing one's own story and, what is different, being able to tell it. In #1, I defend the view that for humans the close connection claim is plausible, but that the necessary condition claim may not be. In # 2, I ask whether the claim that there is a close connection is a claim about the metaphysics of identity or the epistemics of identity, both or neither. I argue that the thesis is best understood as epistemic and existential (it locates purpose in a life) and that (just as John Locke suggested) it is neutral between all positions on the metaphysics of the conscious mind. In # 3, I ask whether narrative identity requires autobiographical memory, and argue that if it does, then only humans over five or six years of age would have this sort of identity, infants and non human primates might not.
    Does autobiographical memory require consciousness? Robots have autobiographical memory and can give reports, but are not conscious.
    These latter results are good or bad, depending on what work one thinks a criterion of identity ought to do. In # 4, I ask whether there are any interesting common features of narrative identity that come from claiming that narrative identity involves telling a story, which is like a novel. The common analogy begs an answer to the question: what is a novel like? This question is difficult. Some poems are novel-like (Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" & "The Waste Land," Whitman's "Song of Myself") and some novels are poem-like (Proust). Also why is narrative identity compared so often to a fiction rather than to another genre, autobiography, which is supposed to be more epistemically constrained than fiction? My overall conclusion is on the skeptical side: if narrative identity rests on an analogy to "the novel" and "the novel" is a conventional kind that doesn't even require a certain temporal order, then all the interesting facts about each person will be about the particulars of his or her story, not in the fact that he or she has a story.

The Law, Ritual Participation and Maimonidean Imagination: A Dynamic Guide of the Perplexed
Melinda C. Hall (Vanderbilt)
Response: Jason Aleksander (St. Xavier)
Furman 109

Distinguishing Sportsmanship
Jacob Bethem (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Matthew Pianalto (Eastern Kentucky U.)
Furman 132

Physical Intentionality and the Open Future
David Taylor (Independent Scholar)
Response: Jason Fishel (Walters State CC)
Furman 217

Must We Always Stand By Our Convictions?
Matthew Pianalto (Eastern Kentucky U.)
Response: Brian Ribeiro (U. Tennessee – Chattanooga)
Furman 109

Trope Theory as an explanation of resemblance and kinds
Osasha Fertal (Agnes Scott College)
Response: David Taylor (Independent Scholar)
Furman 132

Justice and Luck
Jeff Cervantez (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Stacie Hocke (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Furman 217

Ataraxia: Why Nietzsche Rejects Epicurus
Andrew Hatley (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Christopher Davies (Vanderbilt)
Furman 106

Skepticism and Epistemic Akrasia
Brian Ribeiro (U. Tennessee – Chattanooga)
Response: Eric Thompson (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Furman 109

The Liberal Principle of Public Motivation
Matt Deaton (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Rickey Ray (Northeast State CC)
Furman 132

A Critique of Talisse’s and Aikin’s Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists
Joshua Anderson (St. Louis U.)
Response: Scott F. Aikin (Vanderbilt)
Furman 217

Keeping Your Cool: A Psychoanalytic Explanation of Affect-Regulation
Robert Guerin (U. Kentucky)
Response: Matthew Ruble (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Furman 106

Justice v. Fairness
Charles Cardwell (Pellissippi State CC)
Response: Trevor Hedberg (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Furman 109

Refusing Determinism: The Dialectical Development of a Marxian Account of Action
Roman Briggs (U. Arkansas)
Response: Chris King (Roane State CC)
Furman 132

“Making martyrs of our children: Religiously-based requests for inappropriate treatment in pediatrics
Gregory Bock (Walters State CC)
Response: Gavin Enck (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Furman 217

Self-Knowledge, Rationality, and Justification
Casey Woodling (U. Florida)
Response: Andrew Naylor (Indiana U. – South Bend)
Furman 106

Assertion and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Jennifer Lackey
Eric Thompson (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Joshua Anderson (St. Louis University)
Furman 109

The Circumstances of Justice and the Role of Justice as Fairness
Trevor Hedberg (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Phil Oliver (Middle Tennessee State)
Furman 132

Dialectic of Dogmatism and Skepticism
Scott F. Aikin (Vanderbilt)
Response: John R. Fitzpatrick (U. Tennessee – Chattanooga)
Furman 217

Remembering-that: Episodic vs. Semantic
Andrew Naylor (Indiana U. – South Bend)
Response: Casey Woodling (U. Florida)
Furman 106

Tact and Morality
Andrew Terjesen (Rhodes College)
Response: Rickey Ray (Northeast State CC)
Furman 109

Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and Human Rights
John R. Fitzpatrick (U. Tennessee – Chattanooga)
Response: Ben Mitchell (Union University)
Furman 132

Plato and Aristotle on Pleasure, Moral Development, and Virtue
Michael D. Burroughs (U. Memphis)
Response: Jacob Bethem (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Furman 217

What’s So Lucky About Luck: Moral Luck, Justice and Equal Chances
Stacie M. Hocke (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Response: Roman Briggs (U. Arkansas)
Furman 106

Dogmatism and skepticism are connected as dialectical antitheses, skepticism as anti-dogmatism and dogmatism as anti-skepticism. The ironic turn of the dialectic is that both anti-skepticisms and anti-dogmatisms turn out dogmatic. One question is whether there is a stable anti-dogmatism. Socratic ignorance is posed as a model.

Joshua Anderson (St. Louis U.)
A Critique of Talisse’s and Aikin’s Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists

In this paper I will argue against Talisse’s and Aikin’s contention that pragmatists cannot be pluralists. First, I suggest that a pragmatic pluralism might be similar to what Talisse and Aikin refer to as “shallow pluralism”. Since, Talisse and Aikin maintain that shallow pluralism is pluralism in name only; I will show that Talisse’s and Aikin’s reasons for their claim are flawed. It will be shown that the reasoning that Talisse and Aikin use to deny that shallow pluralism is actually pluralism can be used to draw an absurd conclusion. Thus, it will be shown that shallow pluralism is a good candidate for a pragmatic pluralism, especially considering that Talisse and Aikin have admitted that shallow pluralism is consistent with inquiry pragmatism.

“Fair play”, “sportsmanship”, and “sport excellence” all describe morally appropriate, sport-related behavior, but one ought to be conscientious of their unique meanings for a proper understanding of sport ethics. Rather than using these terms synonymously, I propose that fair play is merely one type of sportsmanship, and I agree with Robert Schneider that sportsmanship is only one component of sport excellence. I build on additional works of Charles Kennedy, Robert Butcher, and Angela Schneider to present a united description of sportsmanship.

Gregory Bock (Walters State CC)
Making martyrs of our children: Religiously-based requests for inappropriate treatment in pediatrics

Julian Savulescu’s approach to handling religiously-based requests for inappropriate medical treatment in pediatrics focuses primarily on physical safety, a secular conception of well-being and future autonomy. In this paper, I argue that such an approach is culturally and religiously insensitive and overlooks other important values. An acceptable approach will give more consideration to cultural and religious beliefs while still holding them to a high ethical standard.

Roman Briggs (U. Arkansas)
Refusing Determinism: The Dialectical Development of a Marxian Account of Action

Among the positions foundational to orthodox Marxism is the notion that the actions of human beings are wholly determined by the social conditions in which they find themselves; it is in the name of hard determinism that the Marxist feels confident in making large-scale predictions regarding political behavior and the evolution of super-structural political institutions. As Marxism matured, however, the tendency toward a kind of compatiblism increased. Here, I offer a dialectical (historical) reading which seeks to explain how this shift in ideology – a shift which I take to be a positive one in the history of Marxism – took place.

Michael D. Burroughs (U. Memphis)
Plato and Aristotle on Pleasure, Moral Development, and Virtue

Plato and Aristotle agree that the child—the subject of moral development—is wholly appetitive with a capacity for habituation (via the use of pleasure) to the ends of the virtuous agent. But the role of pleasure in the virtuous life sharply diverges for Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle regards pleasure as a significant component of eudaimonia whereas Plato regards pleasure as inessential to human excellence. This divergence stems from disagreements as to the ontological status of pleasure, the extent to which bodily pleasure is a necessary component of the good life, and, further, the role of pleasure in virtuous action.

In a well-known exchange regarding capital punishment, Stephen Nathanson and Ernest Van den Haag fully agree on descriptive facts but arrive at diametrically opposite positions as to justice. I suggest that part of the problem is tied to conceptual muddles regarding the concepts of justice and fairness. An analysis of these concepts leads to the conclusion that those who attack capital punishment on grounds of unequal distribution are doomed to fail if they insist on approaching the problem from a justice perspective. On the other hand, they might be able to make a convincing case if they would turn to principles of fairness and build upon the real desire that justice be fair.

This paper provides a measure of intuitive support for luck egalitarianism. Particularly, it supports the fundamental idea behind the luck egalitarian project—viz., the intuition that justice requires neutralizing the bad consequences of morally arbitrary disparities. I claim this intuition is especially relevant when inequalities present a significant disadvantage to someone, simply on account of bad luck. While arguing this point, I interact with a formidable challenge to the luck-neutralizing project presented by Susan Hurley. Hurley claims that neutralizing luck cannot provide a basis for justice. She provides two main reasons for this: the egalitarian fallacy and the responsibility regress. I conclude that both of these challenges fail to undermine the intuition that justice requires neutralizing bad luck. In the end, there’s reason to think neutralizing bad luck makes a state more just than it would be otherwise.

Matt Deaton (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
The Liberal Principle of Public Motivation

John Rawls argues that in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism, liberal democratic citizens and officials must draw from a common pool of premises and values when deciding matters of basic justice. I contend that Rawls’s premises require that political participants be fully motivated by these shared public considerations— relegating comprehensive doctrines, both religious and secular, to an even lesser role than Rawls himself recognizes. Contrary to contemporary Rawlsians, I argue that offering justifications in public language for policies truly motivated by nonpublic considerations is unacceptable on grounds that it undermines mutual respect, the epistemic benefits of deliberation, and legitimate coercion.

Osasha Fertal (Agnes Scott College)
Trope Theory as an explanation of resemblance and kinds

Subject-predicate discourse leads us to question the ontological status of properties, kinds and relations. In the first part of this paper I argue that Trope Theory offers the most convincing explanation of attributes as sets of unanalyzable resemblance in particulars. In the second part I present a theory of particulars, drawing on Lynne Baker’s constitution view and using the insights gained from Trope Theory to provide an account of kinds as sets. I claim that this approach preserves some fundamental intuitions about the world and provides a plausible account of subject-predicate discourse, particulars, and kinds.

John R. Fitzpatrick (U. Tennessee – Chattanooga)
Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and Human Rights

For Kant moral rules and rights are absolute. So, if one believes in human rights, plural, Kant cannot offer you a vehicle for balancing such rights, because, in principle, Kantian absolute rights cannot be balanced against each other. Utilitarians, on the other hand, can recognize human rights, plural, since utilitarianism is well suited to do so; when rights are in conflict balance things out with the principle of utility.

Robert Guerin (U. Kentucky)
Keeping Your Cool: A Psychoanalytic Explanation of Affect-Regulation

This essay explores the development of the ego and affect-regulation through a primitive defense mechanism and parental mirroring. I am interested in how an infant comes to gain a representational understanding of herself, and thereby modulation, of her affects through a defensive procedure and interactions with primary caregivers. I will begin by focusing my attention on a fundamental insight by Freud in his Civilization and Its Discontents. Freud hypothesizes late in his career that ego and reality are primarily unified. There can be no distinction between ego and external world, because “originally the ego includes everything.” Now Freud tells us in this same work that the ego then separates from itself a reality. This insight, what I will call the primary unification hypothesis, denotes a defensive procedure, but a procedure that regulates an affective experience and consequently constitutes an ego. If we look to recent research by Peter Fonagy, however, we find that infants come to regulate affective experiences initially through parental reflection. This is what Fonagy calls the social biofeedback theory of affect mirroring, which culminates in the ability of mentalization. Given Fonagy’s insights, I argue that Freud’s hypothesis, although perhaps untenable according to current psychoanalytic research, can be seen as a symptom found in borderline personality disorder. I intend to show that this hypothesis can be observed in a specific psychopathology, thereby saving his assumption from complete disregard.

Melinda C. Hall (Vanderbilt)
The Law, Ritual Participation and Maimonidean Imagination: A Dynamic Guide of the Perplexed

Maimonides points to the varied methods in which exercises of ritual and behavior are infused with the power to direct belief continually toward God. Those who rely on images and imagination as a result of a lack of conceptual understanding do not remain in doubt; the images, as they conform to the law, push those persons forward to greater conceptual understanding. I argue that what we imagine, when informed by divine command, is never a simple patch for the holes or a stagnant picture. Instead, the images fostered by the law and condoned by Maimonides are continually generative.

Andrew Hatley (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Ataraxia: Why Nietzsche Rejects Epicurus

Almost all the scholarship on Nietzsche's reception of Epicurus attempts to demonstrate the affinity of both philosophers, along with the influence the Greek has on Nietzsche. Though spending sometime "in the Garden," Nietzsche, however, comes to emphatically oppose the mental aspect of the telos in Epicureanism, ataraxia, freedom from mental disturbance. This paper distills all the attacks found in Nietzsche's writings into The Weakness Argument contra Epicurus in his positing of ataraxia as the highest value or moral end. After taking a look at both sides, the paper suspends judgment on this issue, primarily because the issue comes down to an investigation of mental states of pleasure and pain, something itself yielding, as the Skeptics would say "contrary appearances."

Trevor Hedberg (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
The Circumstances of Justice and the Role of Justice as Fairness

In this paper, I explore some of the limitations of justice as fairness and the circumstances in which it cannot bring a society closer to Rawls’ model of social justice. First, I examine a hypothetical case where the circumstances of justice do not obtain within a certain society. I then identify the two primary functions of justice as fairness: to guide us toward Rawls’ vision of a just, stable democratic society and to serve as a symbol of reasonable hope for the establishment of a just society. Finally, I discuss the theory’s usefulness in different types of contemporary societies.

Stacie M. Hocke (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
What’s So Lucky About Luck: Moral Luck, Justice and Equal Chances

Andrew Naylor (Indiana U. – South Bend)
Remembering-that: Episodic vs. Semantic

In a paper “The Intentionality of Memory,” Jordi Fernández proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.

Standing by one’s convictions in the face of adversity and temptation is generally a mark of integrity. Some have challenged the moral significance of integrity on the grounds that people can be steadfast in immoral commitments. One might respond to this challenge by holding that although steadfastness is a necessary condition of integrity, it is not a sufficient condition. While this strategy deals well with some cases, I suggest that integrity can be maintained despite a failure to act in accordance with one’s convictions—though in arguing for this, I do not wish to make excuses for bad behavior.

Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Perhaps surprisingly (again), much of the recent work on this newly formulated question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is actually impossible. I propose to make a head-on attack and defend the substantive view that epistemic akrasia is possible—indeed, actual.

I present a problem for the Growing Block Theory of time that arises from a conflict between the view and standard accounts of the laws of nature (regularity theories and relations-among-universals theories). The problem arises from the fact that the GBT hold that the future is “open”, that is, that there are no determinate truths about the future, which conflicts with the idea that the laws of natural involve universal generalizations which require truths about the future. I suggest that an account of laws grounds them in irreducible causal powers, possessing “physical intentionality”, might solve this problem for the GBT.

Tact has received scant attention in philosophical literature. In this paper I examine situations where tact seems to aid in the process of moral discourse (and even moral education) and consider why tact might be effective in those situations. It seems that tact is an effective way to short-circuit defensiveness about potential wrong-doing and therefore open up lines of communication about morality that would not be available when one uses a blunt approach to the problem. Finally, I address some possible concerns about tact as an instrument of moral education.

Eric Thompson (U. Tennessee – Knoxville)
Assertion and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Jennifer Lackey

In this paper I will reply to Jennifer Lackey’s counterexamples against the view that knowledge suffices for the epistemic right to assert from her recent (2010). For this, I argue that her counterexamples fail a simple test for knowledge when the assertion is made. This loss of knowledge will be explained by the presence of Pragmatic Encroachment. Ultimately, it will be shown that Lackey does not fully assess the possibilities to which our practical interests can impact knowledge across various shifts in circumstances. Following this, we should no longer view her counterexamples as a threat to the knowledge assertion principle.

This paper examines an objection that Baron Reed makes to the rational agency view of self-knowledge, the view that “self-knowledge is not to be understood as a cognitive connection to an independently existing mental state but rather as a constitutive relation grounded in the very nature of rational agency” (Reed 2010: 165). I argue that the objection is unsuccessful and that the rational agency view must be true if we have self-knowledge of our own minds.