Hobbes

Tennessee Philosophical Association
45th Annual Meeting: Oct. 25-26, 2013
Vanderbilt University

Keynote Speaker: Mylan Engel, Northern Illinois University

"Is Theism Irrational?"

Mylan Engel (Ph.D., Arizona) is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University. He is a philosopher of wide interests ranging from epistemology and theories of justification, to philosophy of religion, to animal ethics and vegetarianism. Representative publications include The Philosophy of Animal Rights (co-written with Kathie Jenni - Lantern Books), "Coherentism and the Justification of Moral Beliefs" (Southern Journal of Philosophy), "The Commonsense Case against Animal Experimentation" in The Ethics of Animal Research (MIT Press), "Epistemic Luck," (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), "What's Wrong with Contextualism" (Erkenntnis), "The Mere Considerability of Animals" (Acta Analytica), "Why YOU Are Committed to the Immorality of Eating Meat" (Social and Personal Ethics), "The Possibility of Maximal Greatness Examined" (Acta Analytica), and "Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology" (Philosophical Studies).

The Business of Complaining Ethically
Landon Schurtz (University of Oklahoma)
Response: Rick Ray (Northeast State)
Furman 007

Moral Rationalism, Instrumental Rationality, and Psychopathy
Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)
Response: Elizabeth Edenberg (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 106

Attention and Justified Believing
D.S. Nelson (University of Missouri)
Response: Andrew Naylor (Indiana University South Bend)
Furman 109

The Role of the Schematism in Kant’s First and Third Critiques
William Britton (University of Memphis)
Response: Erin Bradfield (University of the South)
Furman 209

Bioethics and Respect for Tradition
Gregory L. Bock (Walters State Community College)
Response: Matthew Pianalto (Eastern Kentucky University)
Furman 217

Why Homosexual Sex is Immoral
Timothy Hsiao (Florida State University)
Response: Emily McGill (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 007

William James’ Pragmatic Religious Attitude and the Limits of American Ethnocentrism
Darla Migan (Vanderbilt University)
Response: Sam von Misener (Belmont University)
Furman 106

Too Much Higher-Order Knowledge (For Reliabilism)
Jacob N. Caton (Arkansas State University)
Response: Andrew Harrison (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Furman 109

Nietzschean Patience
Matthew Pianalto (Eastern Kentucky University)
Response: Peter Antich (University of Kentucky)
Furman 209

Vagueness and Neutrality
Darren Hibbs (Nova Southeastern University)
Response: Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 217

Rethinking Prima Facie Duties
David Kaspar (St. John's University)
Response: Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)
Furman 007

The Garden of Eden and Divine Command Theory
Charles E. Cardwell (Pellissippi State)
Response: Caleb Clanton (Lipscomb University)
Furman 106

AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS: Varieties of Epistemic Luck
Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois University)
Critical Replies from: Thomas Dabay (Vanderbilt University) and Andrew Forcehimes (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 109

Alcoholics Anonymous & God: The Sobering Affect Of The Pragmatic Method
Sam von Mizener (Belmont University)
Response: Phil Oliver (Middle Tennessee University)
Furman 209

Against Popularization
Noel Boyle (Belmont University)
Response: Mark Michael (Austin Peay University)
Furman 217

AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS: Liberalism, Stability and Fairness
John Garthoff (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Critical Replies from: Paul Morrow (Vanderbilt University) and Mark Michael (Austin Peay University)
Furman 007

On the Rationality of Mystical-Perceptual Practice
Amanda Silbernagel (University of Kentucky)
Response: Brian Ribeiro (University of Tennessee, Chattanooga)
Furman 106

Moderate Justificational Preservationism Defended
Andrew Naylor (Indiana University, South Bend)
Response: Jacob N. Caton (Arkansas State University)
Furman 109

AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS: Hegel’s Metaphysics: Language and Actuality
Andrew Davis (Belmont University)
Critical Replies from: Sasha Alekseyeva (Vanderbilt University) and Garrett Bredeson (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 209

Q: What is Real: Realism or Anti-Realism? A: Yes.
J. Kenneth Arnette (Independent Scholar)
Response: Norman Whitman (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 217

Can Truth Play A Role in Public Reason?
Elizabeth Edenberg (Vanderbilt University)
Response: Qianlu Ying (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Furman 007

Secular vs. Religious Obligations to Forgive
Court Lewis (Owensboro Community and Technical College)
Response: Landon Schurtz (University of Oklahoma)
Furman 106

Threshold Accounts of Belief and the Problem of Non-.5 Suspension
Andrew Harrison (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Response: Georgi Gardiner (Rutgers University)
Furman 109

Into Earliness: Early Death, Sacrifice, and Unripe Words in Heidegger
Peter Antich (University of Kentucky)
Response: C.J. Davies (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 209

The Persistence of Mindreading in Ratcliffe's Embodied-Situated Model of Interpersonal Understanding
Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira (University of São Paulo, Brazil & Georgia Institute of Technology)
Response: Noel Boyle (Belmont University)
Furman 217

Waterboarding and the Platinum Rule
Mark Coppenger (Southern Baptist Theological Seminary)
Response: Luke Semrau (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 007

Theism, Presentism, and Truth’s Relation to Being
Allen S. Gehring Jr. (Brescia University)
Response: Amanda Silbernagel (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Furman 106

On Morality’s Immunity to Luck
Qianlu Ying (University of Tennessee (Knoxville)
Response: David Kaspar (St. John's University)
Furman 109

Stoicism and Feminism: A Close Miss
Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt University) and Emily McGill (Vanderbilt University)
Response: Amy McKiernan (Vanderbilt University)
Furman 209

How Animalists Can Survive the Corpse Problem
Joshua L. Watson (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Response: Jonathan Garthoff (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Furman 217

Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt) and Emily McGill (Vanderbilt)
“Stoicism and Feminism: A Close Miss”

The stoics held women were equal to men in their capacity for reason. Yet these same stoics held that women were to cultivate different virtues from men, particularly those of modest masters of the home. There is first the interpretive question as to whether these views are consistent, and second the evaluative question of the normative soundness of that consistency or inconsistency. We hold that the two views are consistent, but this consistency is not normatively sound. Epictetus’ Enchiridion 40 will be our test case.

Peter Antich (University of Kentucky)
“Into Earliness: Early Death, Sacrifice, and Unripe Words in Heidegger”

This purpose of this paper is to trace the figure of early death in some of Heidegger's works, and to ask what the significance of this figure is for Heidegger. A secondary aim is to consider why the figure of early death repeatedly arises in connection with Heidegger's discussion of language. This purpose is meant to be achieved by gathering together and demonstrating the relation between several instances of this figure, namely, in “A Dialogue on Language,” “Language in the Poem,” Being and Time, and The Event.

J. Kenneth Arnette (Independent Scholar)
“Q: What is Real: Realism or Anti-Realism? A: Yes.”

The metaphysical debate regarding the nature of reality has, as one aspect, the conflict between realism, the view that there is an external world independent of the human mind; and anti-realism, the claim that external reality is unstructured, or even non-existent, without the human mind’s actions. I argue that the anti-realist position invokes insoluble problems, revealed by application of Kuhn’s philosophy of science with examples from the history of science. However, the true situation is more complex, as supported by human psychology. I conclude that there is an external world but that some of “reality” is actually self-created, although internally.

Gregory L. Bock (Walters State Community College)
“Bioethics and Respect for Tradition”

In her book Against Relativism, Ruth Macklin argues against what she calls “respect for tradition,” which she considers a “convenient injunction for people in power – usually defenders of the status quo – to keep the system that sustains their power intact.” She thinks that such a maxim may serve anthropologists well in the field, but it is not a moral principle that can justify a cultural practice. On the contrary, I will argue that respect for cultural tradition (simply “respect for tradition” after this) is a universal principle on par with other important moral principles.

As I seek to write a piece of popular philosophy that combines narrative and reflection, this paper explores the difficulties such writing involves. Specifically, the paper argues that two problems raise serious barriers to the success of such a project. First, what I label the Wittgensteinian Problem: professional philosophy deals with pseudo-problems that don’t speak to the problems and concerns of ordinary people. Second, what I label the Socratic Problem: ordinary people are too shallow and ignorant to engage genuine philosophy. In the end, I suggest these problems reflect a dual crisis of our discipline and our culture.

William Britton (University of Memphis)
“The Role of the Schematism in Kant’s First and Third Critiques”

In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a fascinating explanation is given pertaining to what mediates between the pure categories of the understanding and the empirical intuitions to which they apply. According to Kant, we are able to place intuitions under concepts by way of some “third thing”, the Transcendental Schema. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the process of schematizing remains even in our judgments of the beautiful, even though, according to Kant, our judgments of the beautiful cannot be based upon concepts. Thus, the problem of how one schematizes without a concept seems problematic. Thus, I will attempt to show how the Third Critique’s account is consistent with the original.

Charles E. Cardwell (Pellissippi State)
“The Garden of Eden and Divine Command Theory”

A common retelling of the Garden of Eden story presupposes divine command theory. In this paper, I contend that the plain and simple language of the original text gives little support to divine command, and indeed provides straightforward reasons to reject the theory.

Jacob N. Caton (Arkansas State University)
“Too Much Higher-Order Knowledge (For Reliabilism)”

I will argue that we have some higher-order knowledge (knowledge about our knowledge), and that the conjunction of this fact with a standard account of reliabilism about knowledge too easily allows for unbounded higher orders of knowledge. And unbounded higher-order knowledge really is too much. I will also argue that reliabilism about knowledge conflicts with the commonly endorsed claim that higher-order knowledge is “more difficult” (epistemically) than lower-order knowledge.

Allen Coates (ETSU)
“Moral Rationalism, Instrumental Rationality, and Psychopathy”

Psychopaths famously flout moral norms, and evidence suggests that this is due to an affective deficit rather than an intellectual one. Likewise, an affective deficit leads patients with acquired sociopathy to flout instrumental norms. We can conclude either that instrumental and moral norms are not norms of reason, or that emotions play a large role in responding to rational norms. I argue for the latter conclusion.

Mark Coppenger (Southern Baptist Theological Seminary)
“Waterboarding and the Platinum Rule”

Contrary to what one might think of the Golden Rule, with its amiable, accommodating cast, the maxim, when properly construed, warrants stern treatment of others. Proper application of the rule requires that the applier be admirable, his desires noble. This understanding gives rise to what we might call the “Platinum Rule,” which projects what the subject would want were he get a firm fix on the situation and come to his moral senses. With the issue at hand, he could assent to waterboarding if it meant he could avoid having innocent blood on his hands.

Andrew Davis (Belmont University)
“Hegel’s Metaphysics: Language and Actuality”

Hegel’s philosophy of language holds great interest for contemporary readers because it offers a symbol of how current Hegel’s thought is. Unfortunately, scholars often assume that Hegel either conforms to some contemporary dogmas about language or else has a naive or “retrograde” view. I look at George di Giovanni’s reading of Hegel’s greater logic, where he attempts to save Hegel from metaphysics by reading the logic as a ‘discourse about discourse.’ I argue against this view by looking at Hegel’s discussions of language and offer some thoughts on an alternative.

Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira (Georgia Institute of Technology, University of São Paulo [Brazil])
“The Persistence of Mindreading in Ratcliffe's Embodied-Situated Model of Interpersonal Understanding”

Inspired by the theories of embodied and situated cognition, Matthew Ratcliffe rejects the classical model of folk psychology and articulates an account in which interpersonal understanding is not grounded on mindreading and the attribution of propositional attitudes, but rather on the interpretation of behaviors according to shared social norms, and situational and environmental cues. In this paper I present two arguments for why Ratcliffe's rejection of mindreading renders his model inconsistent, arguing first that mindreading plays a positive role in enabling social cognition, and second that the attribution of rationality as a capacity constitutes a minimal type of mindreading.

Elizabeth Edenberg (Vanderbilt University)
“Can Truth Play a Role in Public Reason?”

Cohen has suggested, contra Rawls, that public reason must rely on a concept of truth; however, by developing a political conception of truth with which all reasonable theories of truth could agree, Cohen fails to articulate a conception of truth that would be useful for public reasoning about justice. Herein, I propose a different model to explain the availability and limits to truth in public reason. I call this the ‘Limited Substantive Judgment’ conception, which I think may better track the purpose and limits of appeals to truth when debating issues of justice, rather than theories of truth.

Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois University)
AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS: Varieties of Epistemic Luck

Mylan Engel has distinguished between veritic and evidential forms of epistemic luck in order to address two problems arising from considerations of luck in knowledge. First is the view that luck is incompatible with knowledge. Engel’s view is that only veritic luck is incompatible. Second is the conflict of intuitions regarding special lucky cases of evidential possession. With the distinction in mind, we may resolve these conflicts.

John Garthoff (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS: Liberalism, Stability and Fairness

Jon Garthoff argues that Rawls’ account of political stability is underappreciated. In the paper under discussion here, Garthoff sets out to articulate a more complete understanding of the role of stability within Rawls’ larger project. Even in his early work, Garthoff contends, Rawls takes judgments of relative stability to adjudicate decisively among conceptions of justice. Moreover, Garthoff argues that Rawls is more deeply committed to his account of political stability than he is to the substantive content of his theory of justice, justice as fairness. A fuller understanding of the role of stability within Rawls’ work will illuminate the relative significance of various Rawlsian commitments, and clarify some of the disputes between Rawls and his critics.

Allen S. Gehring Jr. (Brescia University)
“Theism, Presentism, and Truth’s Relation to Being”

Philosophers have formulated different theses clarifying the relation of truth and being. After articulating these theses, philosophers use them to rule out metaphysical positions. One example occurs with presentism. In this essay, I argue that theism provides presentists with a way to explain how the past tensed truths they posit are consistent with Truth Supervenes on Being. Part of my case hinges on developing an important but overlooked epistemological intuition that undergirds this thesis.

Andrew Harrison (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
“Threshold Accounts of Belief and the Problem of Non-.5 Suspension”

The epistemic categories of belief, disbelief, and suspension are common currency among epistemologists, but a variety of accounts of what constitutes belief raises questions about the categories themselves. In this paper I examine one of Ernest Sosa’s critiques of the threshold account of belief, and I conclude that Sosa’s critique, though well-deserved, misdiagnoses the threshold account’s fundamental flaw. I then suggest an alternative examination of the threshold account, using Sosa’s same framework of analysis, which identifies a different culprit: the threshold account’s conception of ‘suspension’. An ancillary upshot of my analysis is the discovery that Sosa’s own ‘affirmative’ account suffers from the same feature, and that a natural remedy for both accounts is to limit the epistemic category of suspension to non-.5 suspension only.

Two definitions of vagueness are discussed. Both definitions aim to provide a neutral characterization of vagueness that all parties to the vagueness debate can accept. I argue that neither definition is genuinely neutral.

Critics of homosexual activity often appeal to some form of natural law theory as a basis for their arguments. According to one version of natural law theory, actions that “pervert” or misuse a bodily faculty are immoral. In this paper, I argue that this “perverted faculty argument” provides a successful account of good and evil action. Several objections are assessed and found inadequate.

Prima facie duty is the key concept of moral intuitionism. Intuitionists claim that our knowledge of prima facie duties is a priori, and that, metaphysically, a prima facie duty is a property an action has in virtue of its moral kind. Recently critics have claimed that the fact that epistemic peers, that is, ethicists, disagree about whether we know prima facie principles shows that we don’t. In this paper I rethink and rework prima facie duties with the aim of strengthening them, so that ethicists are much less likely to disagree about them.

Court Lewis (Owensboro Community and Technical College)
“Secular vs. Religious Obligations to Forgive”

I examine a tension regarding the implied obligation to forgive that appears in Nicholas Wolterstorff’s rights theory, referred to as eirenéism. Because such an implication is considered repugnant by many, I offer two attempts to mitigate its repugnancy. The first attempt uses the conceptual framework of Wolterstorff’s rights theory to offer a non-theistic account. The second attempt uses several theological explanations suggested by Wolterstorff to offer a theistic account.

Darla Migan (Vanderbilt University)
“William James’ Pragmatic Religious Attitude and the Limits of American Ethnocentrism”

The pragmatic religious attitude, as it articulated by William James, is one that defends the rationality of maintaining beliefs based on as yet unverified ‘truths’. However, I argue, that the inheritors of a Jamesian pragmatic attitude towards religion maintain an attachment to religious realism wherein certain beliefs will ultimately have a significantly greater likelihood of keeping a room in the Pragmatist’ ‘corridor of truth’ if they correspond empirically or psychologically with American democratic ethnocentrism. That is, the pragmatic approach to truth significantly limits the range of actionable beliefs on offer to private individuals.

Andrew Naylor (Indiana University South Bend)
“Moderate Justificational Preservationism Defended”

A person S has a memorially justified belief that p only if the circumstances (the grounds) which provide S with prima facie justification to believe that p are the very grounds that provided S with prima facie justification to believe that p originally (or some portion of those grounds). This tenet and three others comprise the view I set forth and then defend against objections to such a view made by Lackey and by Huemer.

Is having a mere experience of x enough to justify believing something about x? Does the experience itself give you a reason to hold such a belief? Or must we, in some sense, attend to our experience of x in order to have a reason to believe something about x? Susanna Siegel and Nicholas Silins have recently endorsed the view that says we do not need to attend to x in order to have a reason to form a belief about x. I argue that the case for this view is weak and that the view should be abandoned.

Nietzsche’s inclusion of patience amongst the virtues he sometimes describes as virtues of the weak might give the impression that Nietzsche does not think much of patience. However, closer inspection of these remarks, as well as consideration of other comments he makes about patience suggest that Nietzsche does think that patience—properly understood—is a virtue. Weaknesses that are misdescribed as patience, of course, are not virtues.

Landon Schurtz (University of Oklahoma)
“The Business of Complaining Ethically”

Beginning from an analysis of what factors disqualify a person from complaining about a given moral breach, I show that the prima facie presumption that a complaint is justified in the face of non-moral offense in the context of a business transaction must be balanced against the potential consequences to the object of the complaint, especially given the particular realities of popular employment practices. In particular, I will identify three cases in which complaints are justified, presuming unjust employment arrangements, as a way of showing that complaints in other situations should be, contrary to naïve intuition, considered inappropriate.

Amanda Silbernagel (University of Kentucky)
“On the Rationality of Mystical-Perceptual Practice”

In Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, William Alston argues that it is rational to engage in “mystical perceptual practice” (“MP”)—the practice of forming beliefs about “the ultimate” that are based on putative perceptions thereof. This argument is based on Alston’s “doxastic practice approach” to epistemology, according to which a belief-forming practice is rational to engage in iff (1) it is socially established, and (2) it yields outputs that are free from massive contradiction. In this paper I will argue, against Alston, that MP cannot meet the second requirement, and therefore, under Alston’s theory, it is irrational to engage in MP.

Sam von Mizener (Belmont University)
“Alcoholics Anonymous & God: The Sobering Affect Of The Pragmatic Method”

In this essay I contend that James’ pragmatic defense of faith is hugely instrumental in the effectiveness of Alcoholics Anonymous. The crux of AA is its claim that what the alcoholic must undergo is a profound psychic change or spiritual awakening in order to recover. It is the application of the pragmatic method that brings about this transformation.

Joshua L. Watson (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
“How Animalists Can Survive the Corpse Problem”

The main argument for animalism is the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA). One problem for those who endorse the TAA is finding a way to rejecting the Thinking Body Argument (TBA) without suggesting a parallel way for non-animalists to escape the TAA. I criticize the primary animalist solution to the corpse problem and offer a solution of my own on animalists’ behalf.

Qianlu Ying (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
“On Morality’s Immunity to Luck”

While Williams and Nagel object to the Kantian thought that the moral evaluation should be regarded as immune to luck, this paper argues against their objections, claiming that both the arguments of resultant luck and circumstantial luck fail to falsify the truth of the Kantian view.