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Tennessee
Philosophical Association
52nd Annual Meeting: Nov. 19-20, 2021
All
events are online on Zoom
See Zoom information for
each event below.
ALL TIMES ARE IN CENTRAL
STANDARD TIME (CST)
Keynote Speaker
Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina Asheville
Fri.
Nov. 19, 2021
6:30pm (Central Standard Time)
Zoom: https://vanderbilt.zoom.us/j/6286060246
ABSTRACT:
I will argue that philosophy can offer us a way out of the
current impasse between the mindfulness industry and its many academic
critics. An individualist conception of wellbeing seems evident in the
popular wellness industry adoption of practices typically associated
with the Buddhist concept of mindfulness. Since these practices are
touted as sure-fire ways of honing a person’s mental acuity thereby
positively affecting her effectiveness, productivity and sense of
happiness, the individual and her material success become their sole
target. Critics argue that such individualism completely misses the
point that the
Buddha had in mind in proposing mindfulness for the goal of awakening (nirvana).
I will articulate how making the philosophical insights and potentials
of the Buddhist understanding of mindfulness explicit helps us by 1)
alerting us to the individualism assumed in our popular understanding
of wellbeing; 2)
reminding us of the resources available for a more viable sense of
wellness where its social dimension becomes central. Thus,
philosophical engagement can truly enhance our everyday lived
experience by offering diagnosis, clarity, and resource.
ZOOM LINK
FOR THE KEYNOTE: https://vanderbilt.zoom.us/j/6286060246
Sat. Nov. 20, 2021: 10:00am-4:25pm CST
11:00-11:55am CST
12:00-12:15pm CST
Session E2 (Zoom
host: Scott Aikin) |
12:15-1:30pm CST
Lunch |
1:30-2:25pm CST
2:30-3:25pm CST
3:30-4:25pm CST
ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS
“Teaching Plato’s Laches”
For twenty
years, I’ve found Plato’s Laches
to be among the best dialogues for teaching undergraduates,
especially in
introductory courses. The dialogue is substantively insightful, on a
topic of
interest to students, an exemplar of Socrates’ methods, and is an
excellent
vehicle for exploring the dialogue form. Yet, it seems to be rarely
taught. My
goal is twofold. First, to briefly articulate methodological comments
on
teaching Plato’s early and middle dialogues. Second, to apply those
comments in
a pedagogical commentary on Laches that will,
hopefully, serve as both
defense of the method and an argument in favor of teaching Laches.
“Hegel’s Method and Marx’s
Materialism: Concrete Freedom
in the Philosophy of Right”
Andrew Burnside
Vanderbilt University
This paper confronts Hegel’s absolute idealism and
speculative method (die
Spekulation) in the Logic and the Philosophy
of Right, putting
them into conversation with Marx. I find that Hegel’s method is
conducive to
materialism, a different thesis than Marx’s: that materialism stands
Hegel “on
his head.” I argue that Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of
Right’ must
be read in light of two things: (1) Hegel’s attention to the concrete,
mediated
universal and (2) his application of his speculative method to the
concrete
relations of the polis. Hegel’s view of the concrete, real universal is
immanent, meaning that it flows directly from particulars and
individuals.
“Future Thinkers”
In the last decade or so epistemologists have paid
significant attention to
cases of peer disagreement. Though it is typically not stated, one’s
peers and
superiors are often assumed to be one’s contemporaries. The major aim
of this
paper is to think about epistemic peers and superiors through time. I
will
argue that future generations are our epistemic superiors and that we
ought to
try to adjust our beliefs to be in line with future generations.
Additionally,
I will make a modest proposal about how we might go about achieving
this.
“Do Children Have Justified
Beliefs?”
Andrew Cling
University of Alabama,
The problem of the criterion argument for skepticism assumes
that justified
belief requires a justified criterion of truth. That seems to be false
since we
attribute justification to the beliefs of children who do not, or
cannot,
believe criteria of truth. This, however, does not show that the
problem of the
criterion argument is unsound. Children’s beliefs have, at best, an
attenuated
form of justification. Full-dress justification requires justified
belief in a
criterion of truth because justification requires that persons be
justified in
believing that their belief-forming procedures are reliable.
“The Ecological Mode of
Writing: Towards a Semiotic
Approach”
J. Wolfe Harris
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
After more than three decades of popular ecological writing,
and decades
more of scientific studies, nothing has been done to avert our path
from its
terminal arc. Lacking a language with which to speak of climate change
–
forced, in desperation, to cling to the existing, outdated modes of
communication, of signification – we are unable to
recognize the threat,
let alone avoid it. Utilizing Timothy Morton’s ecocritical approach,
semiological texts by Roland Barthes, and Freud’s theory of trauma, I
aim to
interrogate the ecological mode of writing itself –
for how one signifies
climate change determines the very limit of our
world.
“Pinker’s Pacifist’s Dilemma
and Peace”
Courtland Lewis
Pellissippi State Community College
2020 saw one of the most dramatic increases in violence over
the past
thirty years. Such an increase raises questions about Steven Pinker’s
analysis
of why violence has steadily decreased and if such a decrease is
sustainable. I
challenge the Hobbesian features of Pinker’s argument to show that the
decrease
in violence is only the result of a violent aesthetic found in popular
culture
and authoritarian social pressures. In a society inculcated with
violence, once
authoritarian pressures are removed, violence increases. To address the
root
causes of violence, society should instead focus on the bottom-up
features of
Pinker’s “pacifist’s dilemma.”
“On the Just Punishment of
Criminals in Anderson’s
Relational Egalitarianism”
Holly Longair
Vanderbilt University
In “What is the Point of Equality?”, while articulating her
theory of
democratic equality,
Elizabeth Anderson states: “Nothing can justify treating people in
[oppressive]
ways, except just punishment for crimes and defense against violence”
(Anderson
1999, 313; my emphasis). In this paper, I will first identify three
things
about this statement that should be troubling to those who generally
find
“Sampling as Hermeneutic
Paradigm”
“Sampling” is the practice in music composition where a
portion, or sample,
of one song is used in a different song. This can be a rhythm break, a
word or
a few lyrics, a sound, or an instrumental phrase, and it can be
“sampled” from
one’s own work or from the work of another. For this presentation the
aesthetic
practice itself is of interest, as it helps expand our understanding of
how to
engage a “text,” especially texts that are composite and/or have
challenging
authenticity discourses—of which the Mahayana Buddhist classic the Heart
Sutra is a paradigm example. The Heart Sutra
was likely edited or
compiled sometime in the 5-7th centuries in
“Secular vs. Secularism: A
Crucial Distinction
Overlooked”
There is a pervasive tendency in the academy and wider
culture to equate
the terms secular and secularism. This paper argues that this tendency
is both
mistaken and problematic. The paper begins by carefully defining each
term and
then it shows how the two terms tend to be conflated in scholarly
discourse, as
evidenced in works by or related to Charles Taylor. The paper concludes
by
claiming that maintaining this distinction is crucial in order to
discern
different viewpoints toward the secular and secularism, and for
supporting the
secular in the midst of the turbulent 21st
century.
“Teaching Formulations of
Rule Consequentialism & the
Divergence Objection”
Timothy Miller
Competing formulations of Rule Consequentialism (RC) compare
the
consequences of codes on the assumptions that they are taught,
or internalized/accepted,
or complied with. Rule consequentialists recognize
that deficiencies of compliance
formulations can be overcome by shifting their evaluative perspective
earlier
in the progression; however, RC’s leading proponents have resisted
shifted it
all the way back to teaching, arguing that what I
refer to as the
Divergence Argument favors acceptance formulations
instead. In this
essay, I contend that the Divergence Argument rests upon two ambiguous
notions
– “teaching a rule” and “living by a rule” – that undermine the
argument’s
apparent force.
“AYN RAND THEORY OF RIGHTS:
ANY JUSTIFICATION”
Francis Chigozie Ofoegbu
Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Nigeria
Ayn Rand in her concept of rights categorically states that
every man in
peaceful pursuit of his fulfillment has absolute right to his own life,
liberty
and property, and it is government’s duty to protect these rights. This
paper
attempts to examine her theory of rights, using philosophical method of
analysis. It finds that she promotes an absolute individual rights and
believes
that no group can make a decision or sacrifice for one’s choice of
happiness.
Hence, this work justifies and censures some of her stance on issues of
rights
in order to put it in perspective.
“Modeling Meaninglessness:
The Uses and Abuses of
Sisyphus”
Sisyphus’s
futile stone-rolling is often
presented as a paradigm of meaningless activity. Recent philosophers
often
suggest variations on the Sisyphus example as a way of identifying what
changes
would make his activity meaningful. However, imagining Sisyphus’s
activity
without reference to its mythical context or to the complexities of
Sisyphus’s
psychology (beyond his first order desires) renders his situation
practically
incoherent and inhuman. If we are seeking an account of meaning in human
life
through reflection on Sisyphus, then we need to imagine him—and other
such
exemplars of meaning and meaninglessness—in greater detail.
“Attention and Cognitive
Phenomenology”
Some argue that there is a phenomenology distinctive of our
cognitive, as
opposed to our sensory, lives. In one argument for cognitive
phenomenology,
Elijah Chudnoff claims that one cannot infer that one is aware of X
from the
fact that ‘X’ features among the contents of one’s mental state. In
this paper,
I reply to Chudnoff's claim and defuse his argument. My reply depends
on the
relationship between attention and content. Then,
I point to another
area where attention can be brought to bear against cognitive
phenomenology.
This shows that attention should play a central role in this debate.
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